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Abstract
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized same-sex sexual harassment as a cognizable claim of
sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At the
time, many scholars found this recognition to be significant and
important, but some also argued that the Court provided an incomplete
analysis regarding the meaning of discrimination “because of sex.”
Specifically, some scholars argue that the Court’s opinion reinforces the
sexual desire paradigm in the analysis of sexual harassment cases.
Building upon this critique, this Article focuses specifically on the
harassment of men who generally are perceived as gender-conforming.
In doing so, it uses masculinities theorization to argue that some
workplace harassment against these men, which courts have been
inclined to treat as mere “horseplay,” is actually discrimination based on
sex. Examining same-sex harassment cases through this masculinitiesmodified lens, this Article concludes that this broader understanding of
sexual harassment is important because men who are perceived as
gender-conforming are entitled to more legal protection than they are
currently experiencing. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether the
masculinity competition that leads to harassment among genderconforming men is actually the epicenter of all sexual harassment. If this
is the case, it seems that an important step toward stopping the harassment
of women (and men who are perceived as gender-nonconforming) is to
stop gender-conforming men from harassing gender-conforming men.
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INTRODUCTION
Riana is an associate producer on a team working on Responder, a
video game that is currently under development. Her employer is High
Voltage. She shares an office with Nick, who is also an associate producer
working on Responder. Riana claims that on four separate occasions,
Nick touched her inappropriately. On two occasions, she was putting
coins into a vending machine, and he poked or slapped her on the
buttocks. On another occasion, when she was talking with a co-worker,
Nick slapped Riana on the buttocks again. Finally, on an occasion when
she was writing on a whiteboard, Nick grabbed her between the legs.
If Riana were to sue High Voltage for sex discrimination, many courts
would find it unnecessary to spend much time analyzing whether Nick’s
treatment of her was “because of . . . sex” for purposes of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).1 In other words, most courts would
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e–17); see, e.g., Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 467
(6th Cir. 2012) (“An inference of discrimination is ‘easy to draw’ with male-female sexual
harassment[,] . . . [and] ‘it is reasonable to assume’ that the harassment would not have been done
to members of the same sex.” (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,
80 (1998))); Perez v. Norwegian-Am. Hosp., Inc., 93 F. App’x 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2004) (failing
to address whether a slap on the buttocks was because of sex and focusing on whether the conduct
was “severe or pervasive” (quoting Hilt-Dyson v. City of Chi., 282 F.3d 456, 462–63 (7th Cir.
2002))); Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 267–68 (7th Cir. 2001) (failing to address whether touching
plaintiff’s breast was because of sex, but noting that “direct contact with an intimate body part
constitutes one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment”); Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s
of Am., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 828, 837–40 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (failing to address whether a slap on
the buttocks was because of sex, but analyzing whether conduct was “severe or pervasive”), aff’d,
507 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2007); Borrero-Rentero v. W. Auto Supply Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 197, 202–
03 (D.P.R. 1998) (failing to address whether a slap on the buttocks was because of sex, but noting
isolated incidents are not a violation of law); Campbell v. Bd. of Regents, 770 F. Supp. 1479,
1486 (D. Kan. 1991) (“[A] slap on the buttocks in the office setting has yet to replace the hand
shake, and the court is confident that such conduct, when directed from a man towards a woman,
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conclude that Nick subjected Riana to unwanted touching because she
was a woman. However, the actual case that was brought against High
Voltage was brought by a man, Ryan Lord (Lord), who was harassed by
another man, Nick Reimer (Reimer).2 In Lord v. High Voltage Software,
Inc.,3 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that
the harassment that he experienced at Reimer’s hands was not because of
his sex.4 The Seventh Circuit first noted that there was no evidence that
Reimer was gay.5 In addition, Reimer’s behavior was not indicative of
sexual arousal.6 Finally, there was no evidence that Reimer had general
hostility toward men in the workplace.7 For these reasons, Reimer’s
conduct was “sexual horseplay,” which the Seventh Circuit concluded is
not discrimination because of sex.8
The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is consistent with the analysis in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,9 the U.S. Supreme Court
case that held that same-sex sexual harassment is a cognizable claim of
sex discrimination under Title VII.10 But this analysis provides limited
protection for men who generally are perceived as gender-conforming.
This reality is problematic for two reasons. First, Reimer’s conduct
toward Lord was actually gendered and therefore based on sex.11 Second,
Reimer’s abusive conduct arguably affected the terms and conditions of
Lord’s employment,12 just as it would have if Lord were a woman or a
man who was perceived as gender-nonconforming.13
occurs precisely and only because of the parties’ respective gender.”); see also Katherine M.
Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 717–18 (1997) (arguing
that when men engage in sexual conduct toward women, courts infer that it was because of sex).
For purposes of this discussion, the Author is focusing solely on the question of whether conduct
is “based on sex.” It is possible that a court might determine that the conduct that Riana suffered
was not severe or pervasive enough to support a sex discrimination claim.
2. Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2016).
3. 839 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2016).
4. Id. at 562.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417 F.3d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 2005)).
9. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
10. Id. at 79–80. For further discussion of the analysis in this case, see infra notes 93–110
and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 213–29, 270–308 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 213–29, 270–308 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 872–73 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that taunts aimed at the male plaintiff for “behaving like a woman,” and which made reference to
him in the female gender, were “designed to humiliate and anger him, [making the taunts]
sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of his employment”).
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Part I of this Article discusses the history of sexual harassment law.
Initially, it was not even clear to most courts that sexual harassment was
a cognizable form of sex discrimination under Title VII.14 Eventually,
however, courts began to recognize that sexual harassment is
unquestionably sex discrimination.15 This recognition was informed by
the theoretical and legal work of Professor Catharine MacKinnon and
other feminist scholars and lawyers.16 It was not until Oncale, however,
that the Supreme Court confirmed that Title VII covers not only
heterosexual sexual harassment, but also same-sex sexual harassment.17
Part II discusses some of the feminist and queer critiques of Oncale’s
description of the meaning of “because of sex.” While some scholars
acknowledge that the recognition of same-sex harassment is a significant
and important step in securing gender equality,18 many still express
concerns regarding how much protection Oncale realistically provides
plaintiffs. Specifically, some scholars find it problematic that many
courts have interpreted the opinion in a way that suggests that sexual
14. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (“The
attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex phenomenon and it is probable
that this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most personnel decisions.”), rev’d, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976)
(determining that Title VII “is not intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to
[a] physical attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened to
occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley”), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Corne
v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163–64 (D. Ariz. 1975) (“[A]n outgrowth of holding
such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any
employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another. The only sure way an
employer could avoid such charges would be to have employees who were asexual.”), vacated,
562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision).
15. See, e.g., Garber v. Saxon Bus. Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (determining that compelling female employees to submit to the sexual advances of a
male supervisor can be a violation of Title VII); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (determining that plaintiff “became the target of her superior’s sexual desires because she
was a woman, and was asked to bow to his demands as the price for holding her job”); Tomkins,
568 F.2d at 1048–49 (determining that Title VII can be violated when the terms of employment
are conditioned upon submission to sexual advances).
16. See generally, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979) (arguing that sexual harassment is sex discrimination under Title VII); LIN
FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON THE JOB (1978)
(documenting the sexual harassment that women experienced in a variety of workplace settings).
17. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79–80 (1998).
18. See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW
182, 182–83 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); Christopher N. Kendall,
Gay Male Liberation Post Oncale: Since When Is Sexualized Violence Our Path to Liberation?,
in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra, at 221, 223–24; Marc Spindelman,
Discriminating Pleasures, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra, at 201–02.
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harassment is mainly based on sexual desire.19 This interpretation leads
to an incomplete analysis of the type of conduct that is “because of sex.”20
Some have also expressed concern that this type of limited analysis
perpetuates homophobia.21
Part III builds upon these critiques and argues that courts need to
recognize that there is a gendered dynamic that occurs among men that
operates in response to, but also somewhat separate from, their
relationships with women. The performance of masculinity is often a
homosocial performance; men are socialized to prove that they are just
as, or even more, masculine than the men around them.22 This gendered
hierarchy occurs among men even when women are not present.23
Furthermore, a man can lose his place in the masculine hierarchy at any
moment because the masculine identity is quite fragile and unstable.24 As
a result, men are constantly competing with one another to maintain, and
even improve, their respective places in the gender hierarchy.25 In other
words, sexual harassment is not just a product of men’s relationships with
women, it is also a product of their gendered relationships with one
another.
Under this broader understanding of gender dynamics, Part IV focuses
specifically on the harassment of men who generally are perceived as
gender-conforming. It argues that some of the harassment of these men,
which courts have been inclined to label as “horseplay,” is actually
discrimination based on sex. A broader understanding of the gendered
dynamics among men will allow for greater legal protection for men who
19. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 1169, 1215–17 (1998); Franke, supra note 1, at 730–36; Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing
Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686–87 (1998).
20. See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 18, at 169, 173–75; David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex
Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697,
1742–43 (2002).
21. See Franke, supra note 20, at 177; Halley, supra note 18, at 191; Schwartz, supra note
20, at 1746–47.
22. Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the
Construction of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM AND MASCULINITIES 182, 186–87 (Peter F. Murphy
ed., 2004).
23. See MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY 11 (2000); Nancy E. Dowd et al.,
Feminist Legal Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW 25, 29 (Frank
Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012).
24. Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777,
787–88 (2000); Russell K. Robinson, Masculinity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and
Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1332 (2011).
25. Harris, supra note 24, at 788; Robinson, supra note 24, at 1332.
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generally are perceived as gender-conforming. But this broader
understanding also leads this Article to raise the following question: Is
the masculinity competition that leads to harassment among genderconforming men actually the epicenter of all sexual harassment? If this is
the case, an important step toward stopping the harassment of women
(and men who are perceived as gender-nonconforming) is to stop genderconforming men from harassing gender-conforming men.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS SEX DISCRIMINATION
Title VII prohibits discrimination in the terms and conditions of
employment because of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”26
The addition of “sex” as a protected category was a last-minute addition,
and there is very little legislative history regarding what Congress
intended “because of sex” to mean.27 Initially, courts determined that
sexual harassment was not sex discrimination at all under Title VII.28
Instead, some viewed this as “personal” conduct between two
employees.29 After all, they argued, it was not typically an employer’s
policy that supervisors ask their subordinates out on dates or that they
condition work benefits upon sexual favors.30 While courts often agreed
that this conduct was inappropriate in the workplace, they did not agree
that it was a violation of Title VII.31
Courts also expressed some apprehension about what would happen
to workplace conditions if this conduct were deemed illegal. Was there a
risk that male supervisors would be the subject of false legal claims from

26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)).
27. See 110 CONG. REC. 2, 577–84 (1964); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 63–64 (1986) (noting that the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex was added to
Title VII “at the last minute,” leaving courts with “little legislative history to guide” analysis of
Title VII claims).
28. Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev’d, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163–64
(D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977) (unpublished table decision).
29. See, e.g., Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163 (determining that defendant “was satisfying a
personal urge”).
30. See, e.g., Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 235 (denying plaintiff’s claim because the employer
did not have a policy requiring that employment be conditioned upon sexual favors).
31. See, e.g., Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556 (“The abuse of authority by supervisors of either
sex for personal purposes is an unhappy and recurrent feature of our social experience. . . . It is
not, however, sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII.”).
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disgruntled employees?32 Would the recognition of sexual harassment be
the end of flirting in the workplace?33 Would everyone now have to be
asexual?34 The overriding messages in some of these opinions were that
sexual attraction in the workplace is natural and that employers should
not be in the business of policing these interactions.35
In 1974, Lin Farley taught a field study course at Cornell University
on women and the workplace.36 She taught this class in the feminist
consciousness-raising tradition,37 and each student shared her personal
employment experiences.38 The class was equally split between black and
white students.39 In addition, the socioeconomic status of the students
ranged from affluent to poor.40 Farley discovered something alarming
during this discussion.41 Every woman, including Farley, had either
resigned or been terminated from a job because a male co-worker had
made her feel uncomfortable.42 Farley later labeled this uncomfortable
experience as “sexual harassment.”43
Defining sexual harassment as “unsolicited nonreciprocal male
behavior that asserts a woman’s sex role over her function as [a]
worker,”44 Farley proceeded to research and document the widespread
32. See, e.g., Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163–64 (“[A]n outgrowth of holding such activity to
be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal lawsuit every time any employee made
amorous or sexually oriented advances toward another. The only sure way an employer could
avoid such charges would be to have employees who were asexual.”).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Miller, 418 F. Supp. at 236; Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556; Corne, 390 F. Supp.
at 163–64.
36. FARLEY, supra note 16, at xi.
37. See MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 26 (arguing that it is important to understand the
experiences of real women so that “the law can begin to address women’s experience on women’s
own terms”). Consciousness-raising was a practice that some feminists engaged in during the
1960s and 1970s. Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, “The Personal is
Political,” and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255, 1263 (2010).
During the practice, participants would talk about their personal experiences. Id. These
discussions would then allow participants to see commonality among the women. Id. Some
feminists believed that laws and policies should be based on the actual experiences of women,
and consciousness-raising provided important insights for some of these policies. See, e.g., id. at
1263–64 (discussing how consciousness-raising groups led to legal reforms in the area of
domestic violence).
38. FARLEY, supra note 16, at xi.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 14–15.
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occurrence of this conduct in a variety of workplace settings.45 As part of
this work, Farley noted two important factors that allowed sexual
harassment to thrive. First, women have historically had limited
economic opportunities in the marketplace.46 Second, jobs have tended to
be segregated based on sex; the more prestigious, interesting, and
lucrative jobs tended to be occupied by men, and the monotonous and
boring jobs that required lower skills and that provided very little
economic power, tended to be occupied by women.47
MacKinnon also noted these factors as support for her legal argument
that sexual harassment is sex discrimination under Title VII.48 She argued
that sexual harassment is not just a collection of random “personal”
relationships.49 Instead, she theorized that sexual exploitation is the tool
that men use to oppress women and that sexual harassment is part of the
systemic subordination of women by men in the workplace.50 In other
words, sexual harassment allows men as a class to keep women as a class
in lower status, lower paying jobs.
First, MacKinnon highlighted research showing that employers did
not shy away from implicitly and explicitly favoring job applicants who
were sexually attractive.51 For this reason, a woman’s sexual
attractiveness was a requirement for many job positions, including
secretarial work and waitressing.52 In other words, to qualify for a
particular job, women not only had to be able to perform the duties
specifically associated with that job, but they also had to be able to
perform the role of sex object.
Further, MacKinnon noted how sexual harassment was used as a tool
to keep women within their second-class status.53 Specifically, she
emphasized research that showed that jobs tended to be sex-segregated
horizontally—a structure that kept women in lower skilled and lower

45. See generally id. (explaining the various studies and different actions that oppress
women in the workplace).
46. Id. at 28–34.
47. Id.
48. See MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 9.
49. See id. at 6–7.
50. See id. at 7.
51. Id. at 18–23; see also FARLEY, supra note 16, at 92–93 (noting hiring policies that first
screen applicants for “sex appeal” regardless of their qualifications).
52. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 18–23, 44; see also FARLEY, supra note 16, at 92–93
(noting the intersection of racism and sexism for women of color since attractiveness is often
based on a white standard).
53. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 4–10.
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paying jobs.54 Jobs also tended to be sex-segregated vertically, which
meant many women worked for male supervisors.55 As part of this
hierarchy, women often had to take on the role of work wife or
seductress.56 This role included performing tasks that women often
performed at home, such as ego-building, getting coffee, organizing, and
tidying up.57 The role also required being receptive toward sexual
advances to be perceived as a “friendly” and collegial worker.58 Limited
economic opportunities ensured that women did not want to do anything
that might risk termination, including rebuffing a sexual advance from a
supervisor.59 This reality left women with two choices: tolerate/comply
with the harassment or leave their employment.60
MacKinnon’s and Farley’s work demonstrated, however, the great
risk that is involved in leaving a job, including losing seniority, salary
increases, benefits, and training opportunities.61 The time it takes to find
a new job also involves income loss.62 Moreover, given the widespread
nature of sexual harassment,63 a job transfer may not necessarily end the
harassment.
In addition, Farley’s research found that women who tried to enter
fields with few or no women were often subjected to extreme hostility
and abuse from male co-workers and supervisors.64 This behavior often
led women to leave these careers completely, and it also discouraged
other women from following in their footsteps.65 MacKinnon and Farley
also noted that limited opportunities in the marketplace necessarily made
women more economically dependent upon men at home, which further

54. Id. at 9.
55. Id.; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN 3–4 (Paula A.
Johnson et al. eds., 2018) (noting that harassment persists in the sciences because men are often
administrators and principal investigators and women are more often lower ranking professors,
graduate students, and postdocs).
56. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 18–21.
57. Id. at 18–19.
58. Id. at 22, 44.
59. Id. at 9–10.
60. Id. at 209–10.
61. FARLEY, supra note 16, at 46–48; MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 210.
62. FARLEY, supra note 16, at 47.
63. See id. at 45; MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 27.
64. See FARLEY, supra note 16, at 52–71.
65. Id.; see also NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., supra note 55, at 83–91 (describing how many
women’s careers in science, engineering, and medicine are derailed because of rampant sexual
harassment).
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undermined their autonomy and preserved their subordinated status to
men both at work and at home.66
Based on this research, MacKinnon provided two theories to support
her claim that sexual harassment is discrimination “because of sex” under
Title VII. First, she applied a “differences” approach to Title VII.67 She
argued that when a man harasses a woman, it is because she is a woman.68
In other words, he would not have sexualized another man in this way.69
Because the woman is being treated differently than a similarly situated
man, she is suffering discrimination because of her sex.70
However, MacKinnon believed her second theory, an inequality
approach to discrimination, provided a better basis for her argument that
sexual harassment is sex discrimination.71 According to MacKinnon,
women are oftentimes not similarly situated to men because of the
historical subordination of women.72 For example, there could be a
situation where a man might be more qualified than a woman for a job
based on stated objective and neutral standards. If he is hired based on
these qualifications, the differences approach would lead to the
conclusion that there has been no illegal discrimination. The man did not
get the job because he was a man; he got the job because he was more
“qualified” based on the stated job requirements.
Under the inequality approach, however, the law would seek to
address any practices that systemically keep women unequal.73 An
inequality approach would acknowledge that “society may tend to create
women in its image of their inferior status, as a group largely lacking in
skills, experience, sense of self, ‘qualifications.’”74 In that case, looking
at the neutral and objective qualifications of the male and female
candidate would not be enough. An inequality approach would delve
deeper and seek to address the systemic forces that have led the female
66. FARLEY, supra note 16, at 49 (arguing that the “[d]epression of female earning power
reinforces the domestic division of labor, . . . which in its own turn reinforces depressed female
wages”); MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 216 (“Sexual harassment at work critically undercuts
women’s potential for work equality as a means to social equality. . . . A job, no matter how
menial, offers the potential for independence from the nuclear family, which makes women
dependent upon men for life necessities.”).
67. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 101–02, 192–93.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 126–27.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 116–18, 174.
74. Id. at 121.
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candidate to be less “qualified” than the male candidate. With respect to
sexual harassment, MacKinnon argued that because this practice
systemically keeps women in a second-class status in the workplace, it
necessarily creates gender inequality in the terms and conditions of
women’s employment.75
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,76 the Supreme Court ultimately
recognized sexual harassment as sex discrimination under Title VII.77
Following the guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), which were heavily influenced by MacKinnon’s
work,78 the Court noted that there are two types of sexual harassment
claims.79 Quid pro quo harassment involves the conditioning of the terms
of employment—including hiring, promotion, and benefits—upon sexual
favors.80
But Meritor is most significant because it recognized a viable sexual
harassment claim even when tangible economic benefits are not at
stake.81 Specifically, the Court noted that the “phrase ‘terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment’ [in Title VII] evinces a congressional intent
‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’
in employment.”82 For this reason, a hostile work environment claim can
exist when the words and actions of a co-worker make a workplace
setting so hostile and abusive that it affects the terms or conditions of the
plaintiff’s employment.83 While the harassment must be “severe or
pervasive,”84 the plaintiff does not have to show tangible psychological
damage.85

75. Id. at 174.
76. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
77. Id. at 73.
78. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985) (describing when sexual harassment is
actionable under Title VII), with MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 32 (describing the distinction
between what she calls “quid pro quo” harassment and harassment as a “persistent condition of
work”), and Franke, supra note 1, at 703 (noting that MacKinnon’s contributions later led the
EEOC to “promulgate[] regulations embodying [MacKinnon’s] conception of quid pro quo sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII”).
79. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
80. Id. at 68.
81. Id. at 66.
82. Id. at 64 (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707
n.13 (1978)).
83. Id. at 67.
84. Id.
85. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“Title VII comes into play before
the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.”).
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At the time of Meritor, many courts had already recognized that racial
harassment is a form of race discrimination.86 Relying upon these cases
the Court argued, “Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a
gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to
work and make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the
harshest of racial epithets.”87
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins88 provided an opportunity for plaintiffs
to present sexual harassment cases that are based on sex stereotyping.89
In that case, the accounting firm refused to make Ann Hopkins a
partner.90 Included in the feedback she received after the denial, Hopkins
was advised that to improve her chances of making partner at the firm she
should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”91 The
plurality held that an employment decision based on the failure of an
employee to conform to an employer’s sex stereotypes is discrimination
based on sex.92
It was not until Oncale, however, that the Court confirmed that Title
VII also covers same-sex harassment.93 Oncale was “a roustabout on an
oil rig in the sea.”94 He was harassed by his supervisor and two coworkers.95 The men constantly harassed him verbally, saying things like:
“You know you got a cute little ass, boy.”96 Oncale’s supervisor also
threatened him with rape on more than one occasion.97 On another
occasion, one co-worker grabbed Oncale and pushed him into a squatting
position while his supervisor unzipped his pants, pulled out his penis, and
86. See, e.g., Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514–15
(8th Cir. 1977); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
87. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir.
1982)).
88. 490 U.S. 228 (1998), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075.
89. See id. at 231–32; see also Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252,
261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that discrimination based on a lack of masculinity is covered
by Title VII); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an
“effeminate” man had a cause of action under Title VII).
90. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 231–32.
91. Id. at 235 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.
1985)).
92. Id. at 251.
93. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
94. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Amicus Brief, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
96-568, Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 13 (1997).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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held it to the back of Oncale’s head.98 The next day, a co-worker forced
Oncale to the ground, and his supervisor pulled out his penis and put it
on Oncale’s arm.99 That same night, Oncale’s supervisor and a co-worker
attempted to rape Oncale in a shower.100
In that opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia stressed that by acknowledging
that same-sex harassment is an actionable claim, the Court was not
turning Title VII into a “general civility code.”101 Justice Scalia
emphasized that Title VII only covers conduct that is “because of sex.”102
He noted, “The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”103
Justice Scalia then gave some examples of evidence that would lead a
jury to believe that discrimination was because of sex in the same-sex
context. He stated that evidence that the alleged harasser was gay could
lead to an inference of sex discrimination in the same way an inference
could be drawn in a male-on-female situation.104 He also stated that a
valid Title VII claim does not necessarily require evidence of sexual
desire.105 Other examples of plausible evidence include evidence of
general hostility to a particular sex or evidence of disparate treatment of
the sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.106 Evidence “tinged with offensive
sexual connotations” would not be sufficient, however, unless there was
additional evidence that harassment was because of sex.107
There was a second reason that Justice Scalia gave to refute the notion
that same-sex harassment claims would turn Title VII into a general
civility code: the harassment must be so severe or pervasive that a
reasonable plaintiff would find it hostile and abusive.108 He explained,
“We have always regarded that requirement as crucial, and as sufficient
to ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring)).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 80–81.
107. Id. at 81.
108. Id.
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workplace—such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation—
for discriminatory ‘conditions of employment.’”109 Specifically,
A professional football player’s working environment is not
severely or pervasively abusive, for example, if the coach
smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field—even
if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as
abusive by the coach’s secretary (male or female) back at the
office.110
Some courts, however, have interpreted Oncale in a way that limits
the types of claims that tend to be successful. The easiest way to have a
successful claim in a same-sex harassment case is if there is evidence that
the harasser is gay.111 In addition, plaintiffs who do not conform to
traditional gender expectations also tend to have some success with their
sexual harassment claims under a Price Waterhouse sex-stereotype
theory.112 The Supreme Court recently held in Bostock v. Clayton
County113 that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination,
determining that the biological sexes are treated differently in these
cases.114 But prior to Bostock, courts rarely extended a sex-stereotype
theory to sexual orientation discrimination.115 Furthermore, claims by
men who generally conform to gender expectations, but who do not have
harassers who are perceived as gay, tend not to have much success in the

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Jessica A. Clarke, Inferring Desire, 63 DUKE L.J. 525, 584–85 (2013) (noting how
courts tend to automatically infer desire when an alleged harasser is gay or lesbian).
112. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir.
1999) (concluding that discrimination based on a lack of masculinity is covered by Title VII);
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an “effeminate”
man had a cause of action under Title VII).
113. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
114. Id. at 1741. Specifically, the Court argued that if an individual who is biologically male
is attracted to another individual who is biologically male, he is treated differently from a
similarly-situated individual who is biologically female. Id.
115. See, e.g., Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259 (holding that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not a violation of Title VII); Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217 (2d
Cir. 2005) (holding that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not a violation of Title VII),
overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Prowel v. Wise Bus.
Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not a violation of Title VII). But see Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108 (“Title VII prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”), aff’d
sub nom. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731; Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir.
2017) (“[D]iscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination.”).
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courts.116 The conduct in these cases is viewed as “horseplay,” which,
under Oncale, is not covered by Title VII.117
As discussed in Part II, there have been critiques of Oncale and the
lower court cases that have followed it. Some worry that focusing on the
sexual orientation of the harasser encourages homophobia.118 In addition,
prior to Bostock,119 some argued that lower courts had created an illogical
distinction between sex-stereotype and sexual orientation discrimination
cases.120 Furthermore, other scholars are concerned about how the
“horseplay” cases fail to provide much protection for many men who
work in all-male settings—where much of this type of harassment
exists.121 All of these critiques are rooted in one central critique: although
Oncale expressly stated that plaintiffs are not required to provide
evidence of sexual desire to have a valid sex discrimination claim,122 it
still opened the door for the predominance of the sexual desire paradigm
in the lower courts by suggesting that the sexual orientation of the alleged
harasser is relevant in the analysis of same-sex cases.
II. THE LIMITATIONS OF A SEXUAL DESIRE APPROACH TO SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
Prior to Oncale, some feminists had already argued that there were
gaps in MacKinnon’s inequality theory when it comes to same-sex
harassment cases. Professor Katherine Franke specifically critiqued
MacKinnon’s argument that sexual exploitation is the tool that men use
to subordinate women.123 In doing so, Franke noted that while courts had
116. See, e.g., Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 562 (7th Cir. 2016)
(finding no hostile environment claim because there was no evidence that the alleged harasser
was gay or motivated by sexual desire); Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 468
(6th Cir. 2012) (finding no hostile environment claim because there was no credible evidence that
the alleged harasser was bisexual); McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys., Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 543
(8th Cir. 2003) (finding no hostile environment claim because there was no evidence that the
supervisor was gay or was motivated by sexual desire). But see EEOC v. Boh Brothers Constr.
Co., 731 F.3d 444, 456–57, 459 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding enough evidence to support a jury’s
finding of hostile environment because there was evidence that the alleged harasser subjectively
believed that the plaintiff failed to meet masculine stereotypes).
117. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
118. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 20, at 173–75; Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1746–47.
119. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
120. E.g., Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and
Employment Discrimination, 43 MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 738–44 (2010).
121. See, e.g., infra note 153 and accompanying text.
122. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing
other types of evidence Justice Scalia suggested might support a valid same-sex discrimination
claim).
123. Franke, supra note 1, at 760–63.
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not fully embraced MacKinnon’s anti-subordination view of sexual
harassment, her work had seemed to lead courts to view harassment as
being driven by sexual desire.124 Franke finds this paradigm particularly
problematic because it fails to address what she views as the real harm of
sexual harassment: gender regulation.125 According to Franke, Title VII
should prohibit any conduct that either limits the ways an individual may
perform gender or that reinforces traditional heterosexual gender
scripts.126 Notably, Franke’s view recognizes that both men and women
can be sexual agents and that both men and women can be potential
victims of sexual harassment.127
Professor Kathryn Abrams agrees with Franke that sexual harassment
should address gender regulation and punishment.128 In addition, she
notes that a desire-based approach does not acknowledge other
motivations for sexual harassment, including male camaraderie.129 But
Abrams further argues that female subordination in the workplace should
be the centerpiece to any theory of sexual harassment.130 Specifically, she
emphasizes the importance of work in women’s ability to fully realize
economic autonomy and personal fulfillment.131 According to Abrams,
sexual harassment undermines these goals by making it difficult for
workers to perform assigned tasks, “compel[ling] choices that trade
professional advantage for a more secure or peaceful environment,” and
“depriving the harassed workers of professionally crucial mentoring and
camaraderie.”132 Under Abrams’s theory, “based on sex” means “efforts
to preserve male control by undermining women, or efforts to entrench
masculine norms” in the workplace.133 But according to Abrams, both
men and women can be victims under her theory because gender scripts
can be performed in a plurality of ways.134
Professor Vicki Schultz also thinks it is essential to understand the
importance of work in realizing female empowerment.135 Her specific
critique of MacKinnon’s theory and traditional sexual harassment
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
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Id. at 1204–05.
Id. at 1219–20.
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caselaw, however, is the emphasis placed on sexual conduct.136 Based on
her research, Schultz concludes that most of the harassment that women
experience in the workplace involves nonsexual conduct, including
equipment sabotage, the denial of proper training, and limited access to
informal networks.137 This nonsexual conduct then leads to a selffulfilling prophecy: women are not given the necessary tools to thrive at
their jobs, which leads to their perceived incompetence.138 By ignoring
this type of conduct, courts are not acknowledging that this type of
conduct undermines women in the workplace just as much as, if not more
than, sexual conduct.139 In addition, Schultz criticizes the notion that
sexual expression always oppresses women; instead, she argues that it is
possible to have some sexual expression in the workplace that does not
create a hostile work environment.140 For these reasons, Schultz argues
that instead of sexual conduct, the focus of sexual harassment law should
be on any conduct that reinforces the notions that men are the bastion of
competence and that women are incompetent.141
Franke, Abrams, and Schultz have also discussed the implications of
their theories for male same-sex harassment cases. For all of these
theorists, cases that involve employees who are harassed because they are
perceived as failing to meet traditional sex-stereotypes are clear cases of
sex discrimination.142 Franke and Abrams also allow for some claims
from men who generally are perceived as gender-conforming under some
circumstances.143
136. Id. at 1686–87.
137. Id. at 1687.
138. Id. at 1764 & n.429.
139. Id. at 1686–91.
140. Id. at 1789–96.
141. Id. at 1755, 1760, 1762–63.
142. Franke argues that these employees are being punished for not meeting traditional
gender norms. Franke, supra note 1, at 770–71. In other words, the harassment “inscribes,
enforces, and polices a particular view of who women and men should be.” Id. at 771. For Abrams,
“[s]anctioning men who do not manifest prototypical, (hetero-)sexualized masculinity is an
important way of entrenching masculine norms in the workplace.” Abrams, supra note 19, at
1226. For Schultz, “sexually oriented conduct may serve as a way of marking . . . nonconforming
men as different and less adequate for [their] job.” Schultz, supra note 19, at 1802.
143. With respect to gender-conforming employees who experience harassment, Franke
argues that to have a valid hostile environment claim, these employees first have to establish
standing. Franke, supra note 1, at 768–69. Standing can be shown through evidence that the
employee objected to the offensive conduct of his co-workers and that he was then harassed
because his objection was viewed as gender-nonconforming. Id. According to Abrams, this type
of showing would not be necessary. Abrams, supra note 19, at 1226. Instead, these cases should
focus on whether the conduct was severe or pervasive enough to affect the terms and conditions
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Oncale expressly stated that plaintiffs are not required to provide
evidence of sexual desire to have a valid sex discrimination claim.144
Nevertheless, the opinion arguably still reinforces the sexual desire
paradigm by suggesting that evidence regarding the alleged harasser’s
sexual orientation is even relevant.145 Professor Janet Halley argues that
this portion of Oncale created “a quick and easy route to homophobia via
the inference that because the defendant is homosexual, he probably has
done this bad sexual thing.”146 Moreover, Professor David Schwartz
argues that the fact plaintiffs must prove homosexuality on the part of
harassers means that “Oncale approves a legal (rebuttable) presumption
of heterosexuality . . . [and] thus invites the federal courts to embark on
some potentially very ugly lines of factual inquiry.”147 Schwartz further
notes that Oncale’s focus on potentially gay harassers and its approval of
heterosexual “horseplay” means that “heterosexuals can abuse same-sex
gay/lesbian co-workers with impunity, openly gay and lesbian employees
may be especially vulnerable to harassment claims.”148 Professor Jessica
Clarke’s post-Oncale survey of same-sex sexual harassment cases
suggests that these scholars’ concerns are valid.149
In addition to reinforcing a sexual desire paradigm that disadvantages
gay and lesbian employees, Oncale, at least until Bostock was decided,
left lower courts in the awkward position of prohibiting discrimination
based on sex stereotypes on the one hand, but potentially permitting
discrimination based on sexual orientation on the other.150 Some scholars
argued that this line was simply impossible to draw.151 Arguably, failing

of the employee’s employment. Id. If the conduct was merely annoying, it would not be
actionable. Id. at 1226–27.
144. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80; see also supra note 106
and accompanying text (discussing other types of evidence Justice Scalia suggested might support
a valid same-sex discrimination claim).
145. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
146. Halley, supra note 18, at 191.
147. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1745.
148. Id. at 1746.
149. See Clarke, supra note 111, at 560–69, 584. Specifically, Clarke found that courts
usually determined that any sexual conduct from men perceived as heterosexual was not to be
based on sex. Id. at 560–69. In contrast, conduct from alleged harassers who openly identified as
gay or lesbian was often automatically determined to be based on sexual desire, and therefore,
based on sex. Id. at 584.
150. See Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 400 (2004); Sasha
Andersen, Comment, That’s What He Said: The Office, (Homo)Sexual Harassment, and Falling
Through the Cracks of Title VII, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 961, 962 (2015).
151. McGinley, supra note 150, at 402–03; Andersen, supra note 150, at 962–63.
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to conform to heterosexual norms is a failure to conform to traditional
gender stereotypes.152
Finally, some argue that Oncale does not adequately protect men in
all-male work settings, and they propose that courts should deem all
sexual conduct as based on sex.153 Indeed, if the case had not ultimately
settled, it is possible that Oncale would not have prevailed on remand,154
despite the brutal allegations in his case.155 If it were determined that
Oncale’s harassers were gay, he might have prevailed.156 In addition, if it
were determined that Oncale was harassed because he was gendernonconforming, he potentially could have prevailed under a sexstereotype theory.157 If, however, Oncale was generally genderconforming and his harassers were heterosexual, he likely would not have
prevailed under current caselaw.158
152. McGinley, supra note 150, at 404–05; Andersen, supra note 150, at 963.
153. Chris Diffee, Going Offshore: Horseplay, Normalization, and Sexual Harassment, 24
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 302, 310–11, 364–65 (2013); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1734–35, 1784.
Diffee does not specify why sexual conduct in particular is discrimination based on sex. David
Schwartz, however, does have a theory as to why sexual conduct is sex discrimination: “[W]e are
more acutely aware of the sex and gender identities of others (regardless of whether they are actual
or perceived) when we act sexually toward them than at most other times, whether the sexual act
is an expression of desire or power.” Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1784.
154. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1734.
155. See supra notes 94–100 and accompanying text.
156. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998); supra note 145
and accompanying text.
157. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (citing City of L.A. Dep’t
of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075; supra note 112 and accompanying text.
But see Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1742–45 (arguing that a sex-stereotype theory may not be
viable post-Oncale given the fact that the Court did not propose it as a possible evidentiary route
for same-sex sexual harassment cases). On remand, Oncale’s attorneys opted not to pursue a sexstereotype theory. Id. at 1735. Instead, they opted to pursue two of the evidentiary routes that were
outlined in Oncale: allegations that the alleged harassers were gay and allegations that Oncale
was treated differently than similarly situated female employees who had been harassed. Id.
158. See supra note 115 and accompanying text; see also McCown v. St. John’s Health Sys.,
Inc., 349 F.3d 540, 541–42, 544 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that although a supervisor’s behavior,
which included grabbing the plaintiff on the buttocks, grinding his genitals in the plaintiff’s
buttocks in simulated intercourse, and attempting to shove a shovel handle and tape measure in
the plaintiff’s buttocks, was “inappropriate and vulgar,” there was not sufficient evidence that the
conduct was based on sex); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Most
unfortunately, expressions such as ‘fuck me,’ ‘kiss my ass,’ and ‘suck my dick,’ are commonplace
in certain circles, and more often than not, when these expressions are used (particularly when
uttered by men speaking to other men), their use has no connection whatsoever with the sexual
acts to which they make reference—even when they are accompanied, as they sometimes were
here, with a crotch-grabbing gesture. Ordinarily, they are simply expressions of animosity or
juvenile provocation, and there is no basis in this record to conclude that Hicks’ usage was any
different.”). But see EEOC v. Boh Brothers Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 456–57 (5th Cir. 2013)
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Thus, many theorists have been cognizant of the ways that male
victims of sexual harassment can be harmed by courts’ hyper-focus on
the sexual desire paradigm.159 Yet, much of the focus of these theorists
has been on male victims who are perceived as failing to conform to
gender stereotypes.160 There has been less discussion about the
harassment of men who generally are perceived as gender-conforming.161
As Part III discusses further, masculinities literature can help fill this gap
in legal scholarship by providing insights on the gendered dynamic that
occurs among men.
III. MALE RELATIONSHIPS ARE GENDERED
“Masculinities” is the interdisciplinary study of how men are
socialized into being men.162 Scholars in this area recognize that women
as a class are subordinated by men as a class.163 These scholars, however,
also recognize that not all men are equally powerful.164 Instead, there is a
hierarchy among men that is influenced by race, class, age, physical
strength, and a multitude of other factors.165 In other words,
intersectionality is a key aspect of masculinities work.166 In fact, the term
“masculinities” is plural out of the recognition that masculinity can be
performed in a variety of ways because of these other forms of identity.167
Masculinities theorists also recognize that women can sometimes
perform masculinity.168 In American culture, the hegemonic masculine
identity is a heterosexual, middle- or upper-class white male.169 Yet, most
men are not able to perform the hegemonic masculine identity.170 As a
(determining that the plaintiff did not have to “prop up his employer’s subjective discriminatory
animus by proving that” the plaintiff was objectively “manly”).
159. See supra notes 142–158 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
161. But see supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing how there is a possibility for
hostile environment claims for some gender-conforming men under Franke’s and Abrams’
theories); supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing Diffee’s and Schwartz’s concerns
regarding the lack of protection for male heterosexual working-class workers).
162. See Dowd et al., supra note 23, at 25.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See R.W. CONNELL, THE MEN AND THE BOYS 10 (2000); KIMMEL, supra note 23, at 11;
Harris, supra note 24, at 783.
167. CONNELL, supra note 166, at 10; KIMMEL, supra note 23, at 10–11; Harris, supra note
24, at 782–83.
168. CONNELL, supra note 166, at 29; Dowd et al., supra note 23, at 25.
169. See Don Sabo et al., Gender and the Politics of Punishment, in PRISON MASCULINITIES
3, 5 (Don Sabo et al. eds., 2001).
170. See Kimmel, supra note 22, at 190.
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result, many men actually feel powerless, despite the fact that they
generally have more power than women.171
Masculinities scholars also view the masculine identity as being quite
vulnerable.172 A man is not necessarily perceived as being adequately
masculine just because he is biologically male.173 Instead, the masculine
identity is unstable;174 it can change from moment to moment, and a man
must constantly “prove” that he is masculine.175 Under this view, gender
is what one does, not what one is.176 According to masculinities scholars,
men in Western society are socialized to believe that the best way to prove
that one is masculine is to show that one is not a woman and that one is
not gay.177 Violence and aggression are sometimes used to establish one’s
masculinity,178 and the need to prove masculinity is at its greatest in allmale environments.179 For this reason, scholars have found that in settings
such as the military, prisons, and sports teams, some men tend to engage
in “hypermasculinity” where masculinity is performed in heightened
forms.180 This hypermasculinity can sometimes lead to violence, rape,
and harassment.181 By engaging in this type of violent behavior, each man
is proving that he is more masculine than the next.182
MacKinnon has argued that when a man is raped by another man, he
is essentially made into a woman.183 In addition, Franke, Abrams, and
Schultz have all argued that men who are perceived as gendernonconforming are a threat to male masculinity and dominance in the
workplace.184 These theories, however, seem to focus mainly on male
masculinity dominating female femininity.

171. Id. at 193.
172. Harris, supra note 24, at 779–80; Robinson, supra note 24, at 1332.
173. Kimberly D. Bailey, Sex in a Masculinities World: Gender, Undesired Sex, and Rape,
21 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 281, 308 (2018).
174. McGinley, supra note 120, at 721.
175. Harris, supra note 24, at 780; Robinson, supra note 24, at 1332.
176. Harris, supra note 24, at 782; see CONNELL, supra note 166, at 12.
177. KIMMEL, supra note 23, at 9; Dowd et al., supra note 23, at 29.
178. See Sabo et al., supra note 169, at 5.
179. See Harris, supra note 24, at 785–86.
180. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Our Prisons, Ourselves: Race, Gender and the Rule of Law, 29
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 39–40 (2010).
181. See Bailey, supra note 173, at 301–02.
182. Id.
183. MacKinnon, supra note 94, at 19 (“Men who are sexually assaulted are thereby stripped
of their social status as men. They are feminized: made to serve the function and play the role
customarily assigned to women as men’s social inferiors.”).
184. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, Professor Ann McGinley uses masculinities theorization
to delve more deeply into the gendered dynamic that occurs among
men.185 She notes that male-on-male harassment often takes two different
forms: hazing and horseplay.186 Newcomers to a workplace may be
hazed, which forces them to prove their masculinity to the rest of the work
group.187 This hazing often takes the form of the grabbing or touching of
the newcomer’s genitals, sexual humor, derogatory comments that
reference the newcomer as a woman, or other humiliating acts.188 To the
extent that the newcomer can tolerate this behavior, show that he can take
a joke and laugh at himself, or otherwise show that he is a “real” man, he
is welcomed into the group.189 As such, hazing is not only a way for the
newcomer to prove his own masculinity, but it is also a way to ensure that
the workplace remains a masculine zone.190
Male workers also sometimes maintain the masculinity of a work
environment through regular horseplay, which is another way that they
can continue to prove their masculinity to one another.191 McGinley notes
that hypermasculine horseplay is particularly prevalent in all-male, bluecollar environments.192 In these environments, men may find their
masculinity threatened by the hegemonic masculinity performed by
white-collar management.193 To reassert their own fragile masculine
identity in the masculine hierarchy, some blue-collar workers act
hypermasculine to show how “feminine” management really is.194
McGinley notes that hazing and harassment cause harms for both men
and women.195 This conduct creates masculine work zones that are hostile
to women and men who are perceived as gender-nonconforming.196 This
hostility promotes sex-segregation in job duties.197 These dynamics also
185. See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment
“Because of Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1229 (2008).
186. Id. at 1182–89.
187. Id. at 1167, 1184–87.
188. Id. at 1186.
189. Id. at 1186–87; see, e.g., Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., 682 F.3d 463, 465–66 (6th Cir.
2012) (noting that when the plaintiff complained about the sexualized harassment he experienced,
his supervisor told him to stop whining, to duke it out, or to find a line of work outside of the oil
fields if he could not handle this treatment).
190. McGinley, supra note 185, at 1182.
191. Id. at 1187–89.
192. Id. at 1186.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1217–19, 1224.
196. Id. at 1224.
197. Id. at 1217, 1224.
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sometimes cause psychological hardship and trauma, which make life
difficult for women and men perceived as either gender-conforming or as
gender-nonconforming.198 These difficulties can affect an employee’s
ability to work effectively.199 It also can affect an employee’s quality of
life at home.200 McGinley argues that courts should acknowledge these
harms by recognizing that same-sex harassment in the workplace often
occurs because of sex.201
This Article builds upon McGinley’s work by focusing specifically on
the harassment of men who generally are perceived as genderconforming. There is a gendered dynamic that occurs among men that
operates both because of, and yet also separately from, their relationships
with women. Men are socialized to prove that they are just as masculine
as, or even more masculine than, the men around them.202 But this
dynamic occurs even when women are not present, which suggests that
there is a distinct, even if interrelated, gender dynamic operating that is
really just about men.203 Recognition of this dynamic is important in
understanding that rape and sexual harassment are not just products of
the gendered relationships between men and women—they are also the
products of men’s gendered relationships with one another. Specifically,
these abuses are often the consequence of the instability of the masculine
identity. Simply put, men must constantly prove their masculinity
through the evaluation of other men, and this constant appraisal from
other men can sometimes lead men to perform their masculinity in
extreme and toxic ways.
In another context, I examined how the vulnerable masculine identity
can lead to the rape of both men and women.204 Research shows that some
men try to engage in a large number of hookups not only to satisfy their
own sexual desires, but also to prove their masculinity to other men.205 In
198. See id. at 1189–90, 1239; see also Christin L. Munsch et al., Everybody but Me:
Pluralistic Ignorance and the Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 551, 572 (2018) (describing
a study that suggests that the pressure to conform to perceived masculinity norms in the
workplace, when one does not personally favor those norms, can negatively affect job satisfaction
and engagement).
199. See McGinley, supra note 185, at 1190, 1239.
200. Id. at 1189–90; see Munsch et al., supra note 198, at 572.
201. Ann C. McGinley, Essay, The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99,
109 (2018).
202. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 179–182 and accompanying text.
204. See Bailey, supra note 173, at 332.
205. Rachel Kalish & Michael Kimmel, Hooking Up: Hot Hetero Sex or the New Numb
Normative?, 26 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUD. 137, 144–45 (2011).
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fact, some research suggests that men sometimes get more satisfaction
out of bragging to their friends about their sexual conquests than from the
actual hookups.206 Research also suggests that men sometimes seek
multiple hookups out of an inflated view about how much sex other men
are having.207 I have argued that the pressure to prove one’s masculinity
through sexual conquests sometimes pushes men to act aggressively and
to push boundaries in trying to obtain sex from women.208 This pressure
sometimes leads men to rape women.209 In addition, men sometimes rape
men in all-male settings to prove that they are hypermasculine.210 These
rapists are not simply turning their victims into women; they are
affirming that they are hypermasculine because they were able to
overcome specifically another man.211
It is time to examine more deeply whether similar gendered harms are
happening in the workplace. In an all-male work setting, the need to prove
one’s masculinity is particularly acute. As feminist theorists have already
noted, men who are perceived as gender-nonconforming are particularly
vulnerable in these settings.212 This is similar to how men who are
perceived as gender-nonconforming are particularly vulnerable to rape in
prison.213
But what about the remaining men who are generally perceived as
gender-conforming? Not all of these men can be on top of the male gender
hierarchy. In fact, most will not be at the top. For some, they will not be
on top because others perform hegemonic masculinity better than they
do. For others, they will not be on top because they resist participating in
some of the most toxic aspects of masculinity norms. In the prison
context, this reality leads to men, even those who are generally perceived
as gender-conforming, to suffer harassment, violence, and rape.214
Similarly, caselaw suggests that men who generally are perceived as
gender-conforming can be harassed in the workplace.215 This harassment
needs to be addressed.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Bailey, supra note 173, at 315.
209. See id. at 300.
210. See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 141 (2006).
211. Bailey, supra note 173, at 301–03.
212. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
213. See Bailey, supra note 173, at 302.
214. Id. at 303, 307–08.
215. See, e.g., EEOC v. Boh Brothers Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 457 & n.12 (5th Cir. 2013)
(describing a married heterosexual plaintiff who was called a “pussy,” “princess,” and “faggot”
and who experienced simulated anal sex and other humiliating acts from his alleged harasser);
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IV. HORSEPLAY CAN BE SEX DISCRIMINATION
This Part argues that some of the harassment that is targeted at men
who are perceived as gender-conforming is not merely male “horseplay”
that does not merit legal recognition; instead, it sometimes is
discrimination based on sex. Masculinities theorization suggests that
some men engage in this type of sexual harassment to prove their
masculinity to other men.216 This desire to prove themselves is most
heightened when men are among themselves.217 In addition, men often
police each other’s behavior to make sure that certain work zones remain
masculine, which entrenches masculinity supremacy in the workplace.218
All of these propositions raise the question of whether this gender
dynamic among men is the epicenter of all sexual harassment. If it is, an
important step toward addressing sexual harassment in general is to
address the gender competition among men that leads them on a
perpetual, and often futile, quest to maintain their position in the male
gender hierarchy.
A. A Masculinities-Modified Differences Approach
As discussed in the Introduction, the Seventh Circuit in Lord
determined that the inappropriate touching that Lord experienced at High
Voltage, which included one poke on the buttocks, two slaps on the
buttocks, and groping between his legs, was not discrimination based on
sex.219 Concluding that this was simply “sexual horseplay,” the court
focused on the fact that there was no evidence that Reimer sexually

Wasek v. Arrow Energy Servs., Inc., 682 F.3d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing a married
heterosexual plaintiff who was grabbed by the buttocks, poked in the buttocks with a hammer
handle, and poked in the buttocks with a long sucker rod); Shafer v. Kal Kan Foods, Inc., 417
F.3d 663, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing a married heterosexual plaintiff who was told he
had a “cheerleader ass” and that he “would look real nice on my dick”; was forced face down into
the alleged harasser’s crotch; and whose hand was forced to touch the alleged harasser’s crotch
while the alleged harasser moaned); Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1001–02 (7th
Cir. 1999) (describing a married heterosexual plaintiff who was exposed to the penis of the alleged
harasser on several occasions and, when plaintiff was lying face down on a bench, was told by
the alleged harasser, “[I]f you [don’t] turn over, [I’m] liable to crawl up on top of [you] and fuck
[you] in the ass” (alterations in original)); Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 410–11 & n.1
(7th Cir. 1997) (describing a heterosexual plaintiff who was repeatedly told by his alleged
harasser, some variation of “I’m going to make you suck my dick”).
216. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 179–182 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
219. Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 560, 562 (7th Cir. 2016).
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desired Lord.220 The court also noted that there was no evidence that
Reimer had general hostility toward men as a class.221
This analysis, however, fails to consider the gendered relationship that
men experience when interacting with one another, which is interrelated
with, but distinct from, their relationships with women. In other words,
even if Reimer were to engage in similar types of conduct toward both
female and male co-workers, the meaning of this conduct would be
different based on sex. First, it should be noted that it is possible to read
Lord as a gender-nonconforming case. Prior to experiencing Reimer’s
harassment, Lord was teased about potentially being attracted to one of
his female co-workers.222 Specifically, Lord was teased about whether he
had caught the “audio bug” (the female co-worker was an audio engineer)
and whether he had taken care of the “audio bug.”223 Lord complained
about this harassment, which led to his transfer to the Responder team.224
During his performance review after the transfer, Lord was informed
“that High Voltage is a creative workplace where ‘humor is a common
method of communication.’”225 Later, Lord experienced Reimer’s highly
sexualized harassment.226
Under the hegemonic version of masculinity, a man can prove his
masculinity through his sexual conquests.227 It could be the case that
Lord’s discomfort and resistance to the teasing he got about his lack of
aggressiveness in pursuing a female co-worker led his co-workers to view
him as not really being enough of a man. If so, this teasing and Reimer’s
sexual harassment were ways for his co-workers to assert their superior
masculinity over his inferior, or even failed, masculinity. While female
workers at High Voltage might have also been victims of harassment, it
is unlikely that they would have been victimized in this specific way. In
fact, modern gender expectations seem to be that while a woman should
make herself seem somewhat sexually available, she should not be “too”
aggressive or sexy.228 Otherwise, she risks being labeled as a “slut.”229
For these reasons, the harassment that Lord experienced was specifically
because he was biologically a man, and his harassment was based on a
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
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gendered hierarchy that valorizes sexual aggression and conquest in men.
He arguably experienced this type of harassment specifically because he
was a man who did not conform to traditional gender expectations.
Relatedly, if the facts were changed to suggest that Reimer harassed
Lord because he believed that Lord was gay, Bostock has finally
established that the harassment would be sex discrimination.230
According to Bostock, Reimer would be engaging in sex discrimination
because he would be treating a biological man who was sexually attracted
to men differently than he would have treated a biological woman who
was sexually attracted to men.231 While this recognition of the civil rights
of LGBTQ workers is historic, laudable, and significant, Bostock should
have gone further in its analysis to argue that discrimination against gay
workers is specifically sex discrimination because it is a form of sexstereotyping and gender regulation. In addition, it reifies the male gender
hierarchy.
Under hegemonic gender norms, one of the best ways to prove that
one is a man is to prove that one is not gay.232 For this reason, some may
view actual or perceived gay identity as gender-nonconformance. If
Reimer harassed Lord because of Lord’s gay identity, it arguably would
be because Reimer perceived Lord as either failing in his own masculine
identity or threatening the masculine identity of the job that Lord and
Reimer shared.
Furthermore, Reimer can prove his superior masculinity by focusing
on the fact that while Lord is gay, Reimer is aggressively masculine. The
grabbing of Lord’s genitals is a way for Reimer to show his aggressive
masculinity by objectifying specifically a man. It is also true that Reimer
could have engaged in the same type of conduct with a woman. In any
event, Reimer would be acting as a sexual subject, and he would be
turning his co-worker, Lord, into a sexual object. Importantly, the
meaning of the objectification would be somewhat different in each case.
For a female co-worker, the objectification could be a way to maintain
certain workspaces as women-free zones or to entrench traditional
heterosexist gender roles in which women are subordinate to men.
For a male co-worker perceived as gender-nonconforming, however,
the meaning of the objectification could be to denigrate perceived failure
230. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1747 (2020).
231. See id. at 1754.
232. See supra note 177 and accompanying text; see also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.,
883 F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation as discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”), aff’d sub nom. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731;
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 341 (7th Cir. 2017) (holding that “discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination”).
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in masculinity, to ensure that male workspaces stay truly “masculine,” or
to regulate the way that masculinity is performed in the workplace. For
these reasons, Reimer’s interactions with Lord have a distinct meaning
because they both are biologically men. In other words, Lord was
discriminated against specifically because he was biologically a man.
But most importantly, even if there were no evidence of gendernonconformance in this case, the sexualized harassment that Lord
experienced should be enough to establish that he was discriminated
against because he was a man. In a gender-conformance scenario,
Reimer’s decision to harass Lord probably would have less to do with
Lord’s failed masculinity and more to do with Reimer’s masculine
anxiety. In the competitive work environment, some men might try to
assert themselves as dominant within the masculine gender hierarchy.
The decision to use sexualized conduct in particular suggests that a man
is trying to assert his male dominance over the other male. It is one thing
to objectify a woman, which is expected within traditional heterosexist
scripts. But the ability to objectify a man makes one “hypermasculine”
and reasserts one’s superior status in the masculine hierarchy.233 This
particular need that some men have to assert this masculine superiority is
the reason that even gender-conforming men can be vulnerable to sexual
abuse.234 Because of this intragender competition, a man who experiences
sexualized harassment at the hands of another man is not necessarily
similarly situated to a woman who experiences sexualized harassment
from that same man. In other words, regardless of whether Lord was
perceived as gender-conforming or not, the harassment he experienced
was specifically because he was biologically a man; this harassment was
because of his sex.
In EEOC v. Boh Brothers Construction Co.,235 Chuck Wolfe, the
superintendent of an all-male construction crew, relentlessly teased Kerry
Woods, an iron worker and structural welder.236 Wolfe referred to Woods
as “pussy,” “princess,” and “faggot” as often as “two to three times a
day.”237 About two to three times a week, Wolfe would approach Woods
from behind and simulate anal sex.238 Wolfe exposed his penis to Woods
approximately ten times, “sometimes waving at Woods and smiling.”239
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
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On one occasion when Woods was napping in his car, Wolfe approached
Woods’s car, appeared to be zipping his pants, and said, “[i]f your door
wouldn’t have been locked, my dick probably would have been in your
mouth.”240 Woods found this treatment embarrassing and humiliating.241
Wolfe claimed that some of his teasing originated from the fact that
Woods told some of his co-workers that he used Wet Ones instead of
toilet paper at work.242 Wolfe found this behavior “kind of gay” and
“feminine.”243 In an interview with the EEOC, Wolfe explained:
It’s [not] the kind of thing you’d want to say in front [of] a
bunch [of] rough iron workers that they had there. They all
picked on him about it. They said that’s kind of feminine to
bring these, that’s for girls. To bring Wet Ones to work to
wipe your ass, you damn sure don’t sit in front of a bunch of
iron workers and tell them about it. You keep that to yourself
if in fact that’s what you do.244
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Edith Jones noted that in all-male
workplaces, “crude sexual epithets are ubiquitous to the point of
triviality.”245 For this reason, according to Judge Jones, the only way to
establish that harassment is based on sex in an all-male environment is
through objective evidence that “the victim (or the harasser) visibly
[does] not . . . conform to gender stereotype.”246 In this case, Judge Jones
found no “overt stereotyping” because both Wolfe and Woods were
heterosexual.247 For this reason, she did not view Wolfe’s harassment as
based on sex.248
The majority of the court in Boh Brothers determined, however, that
the proper inquiry in this type of case is not whether the plaintiff
objectively fails to conform to gender stereotypes, but rather whether the
240. Id. at 450 (alteration in original).
241. Id. at 449.
242. Id. at 450.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 458 (alteration in original).
245. Id. at 477 (Jones, J., dissenting); see also Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating that “expressions such as ‘fuck me,’ ‘kiss my ass,’ and ‘suck my dick,’
are commonplace in certain circles, . . . they are simply expressions of animosity or juvenile
provocation”). It is interesting that judges are willing to accept this type of crude conduct in
working-class environments when they probably would not accept it in their own workplaces. It
raises the question whether judges’ class-based assumptions are blinding them somewhat to the
gendered dynamics occurring in these settings. For further discussion about the intersectional
aspects of masculine behavior, see infra Section IV.C.2.
246. Boh Brothers, 731 F.3d at 478–79 (Jones, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 476.
248. Id.
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alleged harasser subjectively perceived the plaintiff as failing to conform
to gender stereotypes.249 It then determined that a reasonable jury could
determine that Wolfe harassed Woods because he perceived Woods as
failing to conform to Wolfe’s own subjective view of manliness.250
The majority’s reading of this case as a gender-nonconforming case is
a fair one. Wolfe explicitly stated that the use of Wet Ones was “kind of
gay” and “feminine.”251 In other words, the use of this product is not
something that a heterosexual male iron worker does in Wolfe’s eyes, and
he admitted targeting Woods in part because Woods chose to behave in
this way.252 Presumably, since using Wet Ones is “feminine,” Wolfe
believes that it is not problematic for women to use Wet Ones. For this
reason, Wolfe is focusing specifically on the fact that Woods is a man
who uses Wet Ones.
This is not to suggest that Wolfe would not have harassed Woods for
using Wet Ones had Woods been a woman. Under those circumstances,
however, Wolfe probably would not have harassed Woods because Wolfe
generally had a problem with women using Wet Ones. Instead, Wolfe
probably would have harassed Woods because Wolfe generally had a
problem with women working as iron workers. In contrast, Wolfe
obviously does not generally have a problem with men working as iron
workers. He only has a problem with male iron workers who use Wet
Ones. Again, Wolfe’s reaction to Woods is driven by the fact that Woods
is a man who uses Wet Ones.
Judge Jones, however, also raises a plausible alternative reading of the
facts in this case. It is possible that Wolfe did generally view Woods as
being gender-conforming. After all, Wolfe claimed that “some” of his
teasing originated from the Wet Ones conversation.253 That raises the
question of what was the reason for the rest of the teasing? According to
the majority opinion in Boh Brothers, Wolfe and his crew “regularly used
‘very foul language’ and ‘locker room talk.’”254 In addition, “Wolfe was
a primary offender: he was ‘rough’ and ‘mouthy’ with his co-workers and
often teased and ‘ribbed on’ them.”255 In addition, Wolfe testified that he
did not remember whether Woods was the only worker he called a
“faggot,” which raises the possibility that he had used this epithet with
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
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other workers.256 Wolfe also testified that he did not actually believe that
Woods was gay.257 “I was just playing with him,” he explained.258
Yet, even if Judge Jones is factually correct that Boh Brothers is
ultimately a gender-conformance case, she is wrong in determining that
the behavior was “trivial” just because this type of conduct is
“ubiquitous” in an all-male work setting. After all, many years ago Farley
and MacKinnon found sexual harassment against women to be
ubiquitous, too.259 But they also discovered that this treatment was far
from trivial.260 Instead, like many women and men in his position, Woods
found his treatment highly embarrassing and humiliating, which affected
the terms and conditions of his employment.261
Moreover, even in a gender-conformance scenario, it is still the case
that Wolfe treated Woods differently because Woods was biologically a
man. Masculinities literature suggests that Wolfe and his co-workers
might have been engaging in this type of hazing and horseplay to test the
masculinities of each other, as well as their own.262 This is specifically
homosocial conduct among men.263 By denigrating the masculinity of
Woods, Wolfe was asserting his superior position in the masculine
hierarchy among the work crew.264 Because one’s place in the male
gender hierarchy is not static and can change at any moment,265 any other
gender-conforming man is a potential competitor in a workplace’s male
hierarchy. If Wolfe viewed Woods as generally gender-conforming,
Woods was a potential threat to Wolfe’s place in this hierarchy.266
Furthermore, Wolfe was also arguably policing Woods’s masculinity
to ensure that their construction site remained a masculine (and womanfree) zone.267 If men start using Wet Ones at the construction site, might
that open the door for other feminine behaviors, and eventually even
women, at the construction site? And if women enter the construction
256. Id. at 458.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See supra notes 36–66 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 36–66 and accompanying text.
261. See Boh Brothers, 731 F.3d at 449.
262. See supra notes 185–194 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 185–194 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 185–194 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 172–175 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text; see also Natalya Alonso, Playing to
Win: Male–Male Sex-Based Harassment and the Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 477, 486
(2018) (describing a study that found that male-on-male harassment was driven by a desire to
reassert threatened masculinity).
267. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
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site, might that undermine the masculinity of construction work? And if
the masculinity of construction work becomes undermined, might that
undermine Wolfe’s own masculine identity? As a result, Wolfe was
challenging Woods to reassert Woods’s own masculinity, the masculinity
of the work site, and even Wolfe’s own masculine identity, which was
tied to the masculinity of the work site.
In response to Wolfe’s conduct, Woods’s expected script was to either
tolerate and laugh off Wolfe’s conduct or to engage in his own
“masculine” ribbing.268 But note that the performance of this script has a
different meaning for Woods as a man than it would have if he were a
woman. By tolerating and laughing off the conduct, Woods is still part of
the male club, even if he may be conceding that Wolfe is a bit more
masculine than he is. Woods’s laughter and ability to “take a joke” is a
show of male comradery.269 In contrast, when a woman laughs and
tolerates similar conduct, she is certainly not treated as part of the male
club. Instead, she becomes further entrenched as a subordinated woman.
Furthermore, if Woods engages in masculine ribbing, he becomes
even more entrenched in the male club, and he may even merit an increase
in his placement in the male hierarchy. If a woman were to engage in this
type of ribbing behavior, however, it is possible that some men might
accept her as an honorary member of the male club. But it is probably
more likely that she might be faced with hostility for failing to adhere to
traditional gender scripts.270 For all of these reasons, Woods’s treatment
as a man was different than if he had been a woman. Therefore, his
treatment was based on sex.
Admittedly, one could argue that Woods should not be entitled to Title
VII protection precisely because his experience was different as a man.
Regardless of how uncomfortable Wolfe’s conduct might have made him
feel, Woods still generally had access to the societal advantages and
power that come with being a man in the workplace. Wolfe’s behavior
was not suggesting that Woods should not be at the construction site
because he was a man. If anything, Wolfe was just trying to reaffirm male
supremacy in the workplace.
Yet, Wolfe was trying to reaffirm a specific type of male supremacy
in the workplace. Wolfe’s conduct sought to regulate how Woods and the
other men at the worksite performed their maleness through a type of
268. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
270. See Bailey, supra note 173, at 309–26 (discussing the thin line that modern women must
walk between masculine and feminine norms).
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masculinity competition. But Woods should have the right to perform his
masculinity in any way that he chooses; he should not have to constantly
prove that he “deserves” his male identity. Even if Woods generally
chooses to perform his masculinity consistent with traditional gender
scripts, Wolfe’s mandate that Woods always do so is stereotype
discrimination.271 In addition, this mandate took the form of abusive and
hostile behavior that negatively affected the terms and conditions of
Woods’s employment.
As Section IV.B discusses further, if the law fails to acknowledge this
type of abusive behavior as sex discrimination, it will be difficult to
eradicate the toxic aspects of masculine competitiveness that may be the
epicenter of all sexual harassment. For this reason, courts should not only
focus on whether men and women are treated differently in a particular
workplace, but they should also consider how certain workplace conduct
systemically creates gendered hierarchies, which leads to discrimination
against both men and women.
B. A Masculinities-Modified Systemic Inequality Approach
This Section raises the following question: Is the masculinity
competition that leads to harassment among gender-conforming men
actually the epicenter of all sexual harassment? Feminist theorists have
tended to focus on the systemic ways that women (and men who are
perceived as gender-nonconforming) are subordinated within gender
hierarchies. This Section explores how these hierarchies also sometimes
subordinate men who generally are perceived as gender-conforming. It
also explores how the subordination of these traditionally genderconforming men further entrenches the subordination of women and men
who are perceived as gender-nonconforming.
As mentioned, some feminist scholars have acknowledged that men
perceived as gender-conforming should have a cognizable claim of
sexual harassment under some circumstances.272 But McGinley has used
masculinities theorization to argue more robustly that gender-conforming
men can suffer harms from gender regulation.273 Because competing
masculinities exist, most men at some point find that their masculinities
are sublimated to the masculinities of other men.274
271. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075.
272. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
273. McGinley, supra note 185, at 1230.
274. Id.
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One important thing for courts to note is that this dynamic operates in
response to, but also somewhat separate from, men’s relationships with
women. It operates in response to their relationship with women because
men are socialized into believing that one of the best ways to prove that
they are men is to establish that they are not women.275 They can do this
by acting aggressively and by highlighting, or even exaggerating, their
heterosexuality.276 Furthermore, in the employment context, men
encourage, and sometimes coerce, one another to engage in this type of
behavior to ensure that certain job positions remain “male.”277
In Lord, one explanation for Reimer’s hypermasculine conduct could
be that he was trying to preserve the masculine identity of the associate
producer position at High Voltage. More women tend to gravitate to this
type of technology position rather than software engineering and
developing, which both tend to be more male dominated.278 For this
reason, it could have been the case that Reimer felt it important to
reaffirm the masculinity of his job, which was potentially “threatened”
by the presence of female colleagues.
Similarly, construction work has traditionally been “male” work. One
way to maintain this masculine status is for construction workers to act
in hyper-masculine ways. When Woods engaged in behavior that seemed
stereotypically more “feminine,” Wolfe may have felt resentment and
hostility because he perceived this conduct as undermining the masculine
identity of the construction site where he and Woods worked.
In addition, it is important for courts to recognize that there are aspects
of the gendered dynamic among men that are not really about women at
all. When Reimer sexually objectified Lord, it is inaccurate to say that the
objectification turned Lord into a woman.279 Rather, it is more accurate
to say that Reimer was asserting a higher place than Lord in the masculine
275. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 177–182 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 187–194 and accompanying text.
278. Associate producer positions involve project management. See A. Rothstein, Job
Spotlight: Associate Producer Pre-Production, Production & Post, IPR (Aug. 21, 2018),
https://www.ipr.edu/blogs/digital-video-and-media-production/job-spotlight-associate-producerpre-production-production-post/ [https://perma.cc/VY9T-JHRE]. According to the National
Center for Women and Informational Technology, the most dominant technology position for
women is project manager. CATHERINE ASHCRAFT ET AL., WOMEN IN TECH 14 fig.1.11 (2016). For
men, the most dominant position is software engineer, and project manager is the third most
dominant position. Id.
279. See MacKinnon, supra note 94, at 19 (“Men who are sexually assaulted are thereby
stripped of their social status as men. They are feminized: made to serve the function and play the
role customarily assigned to women as men’s social inferiors.”).
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hierarchy at High Voltage. Because other technological jobs might be
deemed more “masculine” than an associate producer position,280 it was
probably the case that Reimer’s masculinity was being sublimated by
other men’s masculinities at High Voltage. If this were the case, Reimer
needed to sublimate the masculinity of specifically another man to assert
his place in the masculine hierarchy. Similarly, in an all-male
construction site, Wolfe needed to constantly maintain his position in his
workplace’s male hierarchy. One way Wolfe could assert that he was
more masculine than Woods was by exploiting Woods’s “feminine”
choice to use Wet Ones.
Without a legal remedy, however, the harassment that Lord
experienced left him with few choices: complain, leave his position,
tolerate the harassment he was experiencing, or reassert his masculinity
over his harassers. Lord complained, but his complaints did not improve
his work environment.281 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that after
complaining about some of the teasing that he was experiencing, Lord
was simply treated like a nonconforming man.282 Specifically, Lord was
informed during his performance review that humor was an important
part of communication at High Voltage,283 which implied that he was not
meeting employment expectations because of his inability to “take a
joke.”284 In addition, Lord was sexually harassed by Reimer.285 Overall,
Lord’s experience demonstrates why many men (and women) believe
that complaining about sexual harassment is not a feasible option. His
experience is consistent with evidence that suggests that complaints often
can lead to retaliation and further harassment.286

280. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
281. Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2016).
282. See supra notes 219–226. The Seventh Circuit ultimately denied his sex discrimination
claim. Lord, 839 F.3d at 562.
283. Lord, 839 F.3d at 560.
284. Id. at 567.
285. Id. at 560, 567.
286. See Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events
Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCH. 247,
255 (2003). Cortina and Magley found that 66% of employees who complained of workplace
mistreatment faced some type of retaliation. Id. Most of this retaliation was what the study authors
labeled as “[s]ocial retaliation victimization.” Id. at 248. This type of retaliation affects the
victim’s social work setting and includes behavior such as “harassment, name-calling, ostracism,
blame, threats, or the ‘silent treatment.’” Id. Approximately 36% of the participants in the study
who had complained about workplace treatment experienced “[w]ork retaliation victimization,”
which involves tangible adverse job actions such as demotions and terminations. Id. at 248, 255.
The study authors opined that social retaliation might be more common because its illegality is
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Leaving one’s position is often not a feasible option either for two
reasons. First, most people cannot afford to lose a job because they need
to be able to provide for themselves and maybe also their family
members. Second, even if a male employee were able to find alternative
employment, he probably would end up experiencing a new set of
masculinity norms with which he would have to contend.
Beyond these pragmatic reasons, it should also be noted that some
men may be hesitant to leave their employment because masculinity is
often established in American society through economic power and
success.287 Heterosexual men are often taught, both explicitly and
implicitly, that this type of success can not only help establish a man’s
place within the male gender hierarchy,288 but it can also establish a man
as a “real man” in the eyes of some female sexual partners.289 For these
reasons, many men are not willing to leave employment, which some
view as a key aspect of their masculine identity.290
Given these realities, Lord’s workplace survival required a different
approach than the one he took. When teased about whether he had caught
that “audio bug,” Lord could have laughed and maybe even confirmed
that he had indeed taken care of that audio bug. As an alternative, Lord
could have teased his co-workers about their attempted and failed sexual
conquests. These alternative approaches are consistent with how men are
often expected to engage with one another in traditionally male
environments.291 Perhaps this expectation derives in part from the
perception that men are not supposed to whine and complain; instead,
men should act as autonomous agents who are capable of fighting their
own battles without the assistance of others.292 This expectation also
probably derives from some male co-workers’ desire to create male

more questionable. Id. at 259. Behaviors that are arguably not illegal may be policed less in the
workplace. Id.
287. See Kimmel, supra note 22, at 184.
288. See id. at 184–86; Karen D. Pyke, Class-Based Masculinities: The Interdependence of
Gender, Class, and Interpersonal Power, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 527, 531 (1996).
289. See Pyke, supra note 288, at 544 (noting how some wives do not view their husbands
as “real” men when the husbands are not ambitious and aggressive in their careers).
290. See Jennifer L. Berdahl et al., Work as a Masculinity Contest, 74 J. SOC. ISSUES 422,
429 (2018) (arguing that “the workplace represents the venue in which money—the ultimate
resource in modern economies—is to be made, making it a central context for resource acquisition
and establishing dominance”).
291. See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text.
292. See Bailey, supra note 173, at 307.
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comradery and female-free zones, which bolsters masculine supremacy
in the workplace.293
Naturally, one might be skeptical of the claim that the banter that can
occur in a hyper-masculine environment is sex discrimination against the
men in that work environment. After all, the banter is intended to
celebrate men as a group, not denigrate them. This Article, however, does
not intend to claim that this type of banter is always sex discrimination.
Instead, it claims that, at least in Lord’s case, it was.
Kang v. U. Lim America, Inc.,294 a national origin case from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, illustrates how intragroup
harassment that purports to celebrate the supremacy of that group can still
be discrimination.295 In Kang, the employees were all of Korean national
origin, including Kang’s supervisor, Yoon.296 Yoon subjected his
employees to “verbal and physical abuse and discriminatorily long work
hours.”297 In terms of the verbal abuse, Yoon would call Kang “‘stupid,’
‘cripple,’ ‘jerk,’ ‘son of a bitch,’ and ‘asshole.’”298 The physical abuse
included “striking Kang in the head with a metal ruler on approximately
20 occasions, kicking him in the shins, pulling his ears, throwing metal
ashtrays, calculators, water bottles, and files at him, and forcing him to
do ‘jumping jacks.’”299
Yoon subjected Kang and his co-workers to this type of abuse because
Yoon believed that “Korean workers were better than the rest” and that
Kang and his co-workers failed to live up to those expectations.300 “On
numerous occasions, Yoon told Kang that he had to work harder because
he was Korean . . . .”301 Yoon contrasted Korean workers with Mexicans

293. See supra notes 190, 193–94, 196 and accompanying text.
294. 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2002).
295. Drawing analogies between national origin, racial, and sexual harassment cases can be
analytically beneficial in helping courts see the discriminatory nature of all of these types of
conduct. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–66 (1986) (analogizing sexual
harassment with racial harassment); see also L. Camille Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in
Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 821–48 (1997) (discussing the
appropriateness of analogies of race and sex within the scope of Title VII). It should be noted,
however, that because there are real differences between race, national origin, and sex, courts
should not automatically rely on these analogies in determining the appropriate legal doctrines for
each. See id. at 848–77.
296. Kang, 296 F.3d at 814.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 817.
301. Id.
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and Americans, whom he viewed as not hard workers.302 In other words,
Yoon had views about the superiority of Koreans over individuals of
other national origins, and he wanted to bolster that superiority through
the performance of his Korean employees.
While it considered this to be an unusual national origin harassment
claim, the Ninth Circuit still determined that Kang could survive
summary judgment because he alleged that Yoon was engaging in
behavior based on stereotyping, “an evil at which [Title VII] is aimed.”303
In addition, Kang’s allegations suggested abusive conduct that interfered
with his work performance.304 In other words, even though Yoon
suggested that Kang was actually superior to others because of his
national origin, Title VII still prohibited Yoon from abusively regulating
Kang’s performance of their shared national origin identity.305
Similarly, it is generally fine that High Voltage had an environment
where people liked to tell jokes and keep a sense of humor in the
workplace.306 It is also fine if some of the employees performed their
masculinity in gender-conforming ways.307 What was not fine, and
indeed, what was discriminatory, was the fact that through abusive and
humiliating conduct, Reimer (and others) tried to regulate the way that
Lord performed his own masculinity. Lord should not have had to tolerate
this demeaning treatment as a condition of his employment. Forcing him
to do so was discrimination based on his sex.
Workplace harassment against men perceived as gender-conforming
should not be minimized simply because they generally have more power
than women and men perceived as gender-nonconforming. It is also not
necessary to determine that any harms that gender-conforming men suffer
are the same or greater than those suffered by women and gendernonconforming men. At this point, it is only necessary to acknowledge
that these harms are based on sex and that they may be affecting the terms
or conditions of some men’s employment.308
Although Schultz does not seem to focus on gender-conforming men
in her theorization, she still provides some important insights that might
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (“Whether an
employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not
depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the
discrimination.”).
306. See Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2016).
307. See id. at 562.
308. See supra notes 195–197 and accompanying text.
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apply to them. First, like Abrams, Schultz recognizes the significance of
sexual harassment occurring in the workplace.309 Work is vital for
economic independence and survival.310 It can also sometimes be a
source of personal fulfillment and identity.311 Sexual harassment can
hinder an individual from obtaining these goals by undermining one’s
actual or perceived competence at work.312 These types of effects apply
to men perceived as gender-conforming, just as they apply to women and
men who are perceived as gender-nonconforming.
Second, sexual harassment often involves nonsexual conduct.313 This
nonsexual conduct should not be disaggregated from sexual conduct in
determining whether a work environment was abusive because of sex
discrimination.314 Lord’s experience can illustrate the importance of this
point. The four sexual incidents that he suffered at Reimer’s hands might
not lead a jury to believe that the harassment was “severe or pervasive”
enough to create an abusive environment. But what if the facts were
changed to show that, in addition to these four incidents, Reimer also
sabotaged Lord’s work on the software program that they were working
on, shoved him on occasion, and was generally hostile toward Lord on a
regular basis? Under these circumstances, the combined nonsexual and
sexual conduct could show an abusive environment that undermined
Lord’s actual or perceived competence at work because of his sex.
It is true that Woods was more successful with his sex discrimination
claim.315 But it is also true that because the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit viewed his experience narrowly as a gendernonconformance case,316 his victory is a limited one for genderconforming men. By not appreciating the broader gender dynamics
occurring at Woods’s workplace,317 the court lost an opportunity to
provide men who are perceived as gender-conforming with a firmer legal
path toward confronting, challenging, and undermining sexual
misconduct in the workplace.
Instead, the current status of the law results in some genderconforming men feeling the need to perpetuate certain masculinity norms
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
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Id. at 1756.
Id.
See id. at 1763–69.
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to fit into their workplaces, even if they actually would prefer not to have
to perpetuate them.318 Interestingly, studies have found that some men
only engage in heightened masculinity in the workplace, not at home.319
It could be that “[t]he pressures exerted by the structural conditions of
working-class life may lead some men to juggle a Dr. Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde existence in which they produce hypermasculinity in male cliques
and on the job and an egalitarian masculinity in their family relations.”320
Thus, while it is important to acknowledge the harms that men who
are perceived as gender-conforming suffer as a result of sex
discrimination, it is equally important to recognize that the harassment of
these men leads to the discrimination of women and men who are
perceived as gender-nonconforming. As McGinley has noted, gender
regulation among men goes hand-in-hand with sex segregation in the
workplace.321 When a job is marked as “male,” the masculinity of the job
holders is confirmed and an implicit message is sent that women (and
men perceived as gender-nonconforming) need not apply.322 The
devastating economic, social, and political consequences of sexsegregation cannot be overly stated.323 It shuts women and gendernonconforming men out of certain job positions, many of which could
provide greater economic and personal fulfillment.324
In addition, those men and women who dare to venture into these
“male” positions are destined to be harassed. In a world where men are
constantly competing with one another to prove who is the most
masculine, the easiest way to prove one’s masculinity is to focus on the
“femininity” of the female or the gender-nonconforming male. But if men
no longer felt the need to maintain their spots in the masculine hierarchy,
they would have no reason to harass each other or women to assert their
masculinity. In other words, while the gendered relationship among
gender-conforming men is often a hidden component of the systemic
harassment of women and gender-nonconforming men, it is time to
consider whether this competition among gender-conforming men is
318. See McGinley, supra note 185, at 1230; see also Munsch et al., supra note 198, at 571–
72 (describing a study that suggests many workers overestimate the number of their co-workers
who are in favor of “dog-eat-dog” and “show-no-weakness” norms, which leads workers to
conform with these norms even if they would prefer not to conform, and finding that this
“pluralistic ignorance” is greater in jobs with higher percentages of men).
319. David L. Collinson, ‘Engineering Humour’: Masculinity, Joking and Conflict in ShopFloor Relations, 9 ORG. STUD. 181, 192 (1988); Pyke, supra note 288, at 542.
320. Pyke, supra note 288, at 542.
321. See McGinley, supra note 185, at 1229.
322. See supra notes 190, 196–197 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 53–66 and accompanying text.
324. See Abrams, supra note 19, at 1185; Schultz, supra note 19, at 1755–56.
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actually the epicenter of all sexual harassment. If it is the epicenter, the
response to the harassment of women and men perceived as gendernonconforming men must include a more robust response to the
harassment of men perceived as gender-conforming. If respectful
treatment is reserved only for those who perform their masculinity the
best, masculine supremacy will continue to reign throughout the
workplace and beyond.
C. Further Implications
The arguments presented in this Article raise additional questions and
issues that are worth examining further.325 This Section briefly discusses
a few of them. First, it addresses the concern that some might have that a
broader definition of “because of sex” could turn Title VII into a general
civility code. Second, it encourages scholars to consider how gender
discrimination intersects with other forms of discrimination based on
race, disability, and other identities. Finally, it is important to consider
further how acknowledging discrimination against men perceived as
gender-conforming could ultimately improve the general working
conditions of women.
1. A General Civility Code
A potential risk in broadening the meaning of “because of sex” is that
Title VII could be turned into a general civility code, which clearly is not
the statute’s intent. That said, a more nuanced understanding of the
gendered nature of interactions among men does not mean that the
“because of sex” element disappears. If a supervisor harasses an
employee simply because he dislikes him, this harassment is not going to
be because of sex. But a masculinities-modified analysis pushes courts to
examine the harassment in same-sex cases more closely. Once a court
decides that a supervisor is not gay, the tendency in these cases is to
summarily dismiss them as “horseplay.”326 In contrast, a masculinitiesmodified approach asks courts to consider the gendered relationship that
men have with one another before automatically making this
determination. Furthermore, the fact that plaintiffs have to show that any
harassment they experienced was “severe or pervasive” also limits Title
VII claims to situations that are abusive enough to affect the terms and
conditions of one’s employment.327

325. I intend to explore some of these issues in future scholarship.
326. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
327. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 1739.
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To the extent that some worry a broader approach will limit
nondiscriminatory sexual expression in the workplace, Franke’s,
Abrams’s, and Schultz’s theories are helpful in clarifying the harms of
sexual harassment in the workplace. It is not the expression of sexuality
in and of itself that is problematic. Rather, one important question to ask
is whether this expression undermines the actual or perceived
competency of a worker because of his gender.328 This type of expression
is also problematic when it tries to regulate how the worker expresses his
gender.329 Even under a masculinities-modified approach, there may be
situations where sexual expression does not cause these types of harm.
The analysis of these cases will necessarily be context specific.
However, it is also the case that some conduct that traditionally has
been treated as “boys just being boys” probably should be re-evaluated.
In Oncale, Justice Scalia stated that a football player getting swatted on
the buttocks by a coach is not the same as a male boss swatting his
secretary on the buttocks.330 It is true that the conduct probably has
different meanings in these two scenarios. It also might be the case that
this is not the type of conduct that should be actionable for football
players as a sex discrimination claim; maybe this conduct actually creates
a bond, and not a gendered hierarchy, between coach and player. But it is
still worth asking, in general, more questions about male interactions in
the workplace that have traditionally been viewed as unproblematic
horseplay. Does the conduct make a worker feel somewhat objectified,
even though he just tolerates it as part of the male work experience? Is
there conduct that reifies a masculine gender hierarchy, which ultimately
is harmful for both men and women? Is the conduct regulating gender
and undermining the competency of some men who fail to conform to
traditional “masculine” norms? After all, there was a time when swatting
the female secretary on the buttocks was also considered to be not that
problematic. It is time to start examining more deeply various types of
male “horseplay” that might actually be sex discrimination.
2. Intersectionality
As discussed, the term “masculinities” is plural because it recognizes
that masculinity can be performed in a variety of ways due to the
intersectionality of race, class, age, and other identities.331 Through this
328.
329.
330.
331.
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lens, Professor Angela Harris has argued that police violence against
African American men should not only be analyzed as racial violence,
but it should also be analyzed as gender violence.332 As an explicit
example, Harris highlights the case of Abner Louima, who was raped by
Brooklyn police officer Justin Volpe with a broomstick in a jail precinct
bathroom.333 The reported catalyst for this behavior was Volpe
mistakenly believing that Louima had assaulted him in a nightclub.334
This perceived assault was a threat to Volpe’s masculinity.335
“Sodomizing Louima—not using his penis but an even bigger ‘stick’—
showed Louima who was the bigger man, who ruled the night.”336
But Harris notes that violence does not necessarily have to be
sexualized to be gendered.337 After all, violence is one way that men have
been socialized to prove that they are men in American culture.338 Harris
surmises that under this understanding of violence, it could be the case
that men suffer more gender violence than women.339
Harris also notes that Volpe’s conduct “showed Louima the
superiority of white masculinity, invigorated by a touch of savagery yet
retaining the superiority of mastery and control.”340 She notes how
relations between African American men and white men are
complicated.341 On the one hand, as a class, white men have better access
to the hegemonic masculine ideal of “patriarchal control over women,
jobs that permit one to exercise technical mastery and autonomy, and the
financial and political power that enables control over others.”342 On the
other hand, some African American men have responded to the lack of
access to this hegemonic ideal by embracing rebellious alternatives that
include coolness, physical strength, athleticism, and sexual prowess.343
“At the cultural level, however, these competing forms of masculinity
allow for interracial relations of envy and desire as well as mutual
hostility.”344 With respect to police interactions, these relationships are
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
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further complicated by the fact that, by being working-class, white police
officers also have somewhat been denied access to the hegemonic
masculine ideal.345
Similarly, it is worth considering whether other types of Title VII
claims intersect with a potential gender claim. For example, those who
are physically weaker are sometimes harassed because they are perceived
as not masculine.346 If someone has a disability, it is possible that he could
be discriminated against not only because he is disabled, but also because
his disability causes others to see him as gender-nonconforming. In
addition, an Asian American man might be discriminated against because
of his race and because some perceive Asian American men as less
masculine.347 Furthermore, an African American man might be
challenged in the workplace not only because he is African American,
but also because supermasculinity is sometimes projected onto African
American men, and this projection makes other men feel threatened.348
An intersectional analysis is also important in contextualizing
behavior in the workplace. While violence is traditionally a way for men
to assert their masculinity, middle- and upper-class men are less likely to
be violent because it puts their livelihoods at risk.349 Researchers have
found that men in some white-collar environments tend to assert their
masculinity by engaging in “careerist” behaviors such as “working
nonstop, acting aggressively, and engaging in self-promoting
behavior.”350 For this reason, further research needs to be done to
determine how gender harassment is performed in a variety of
environments. It is worth examining the nonviolent and nonsexual ways
that men might assert their masculinity over one another or might mark
others as not masculine.
3. A Masculinities-Modified Approach Can Benefit Women
One might worry that, by suggesting that male same-sex harassment
could be the epicenter of all harassment, the focus of sexual harassment
law will move away from addressing the subordination of women. That
is not the intention of this Article. While this Article aims to encourage
courts to consider more fully the discrimination that men experience in
the workplace, it has always been recognized within the study of
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
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masculinities that men as a class still have more power than women as a
class.351 This area of study simply emphasizes that both men and women
can perform masculinity, and that men are not equally powerful among
each other.352
The recognition of the gendered harms that men experience is not just
valuable for men, however. The “Me Too” Movement has made it clear
that despite the fact that more and more women are moving into
traditionally male employment and leadership positions, sexual
harassment still persists.353 One potential explanation for this reality is
that the masculine competition among men still persists.354 As women
continue to move into these traditionally male positions, they will have
to start participating in the masculine competition, too.355 Thus, if gender
harassment continues to persist among men, it inevitably will continue to
be problematic for women.
As a point of comparison, the current hookup culture on college
campuses gives the impression that women have truly become sexually
liberated.356 Women have been encouraged to embrace their sexuality,
351. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 165–171 and accompanying text.
353. See, e.g., Irin Carmon & Amy Brittain, Eight Women Say Charlie Rose Sexually
Harassed Them—With Nudity, Groping and Lewd Calls, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/eight-women-say-charlie-rose-sexuallyharassed-them--with-nudity-groping-and-lewd-calls/2017/11/20/9b168de8-caec-11e7-8321-481
fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.e7d7d7c142a0 [https://perma.cc/GX6G-QQWN] (detailing
allegations of sexual harassment by journalist Charlie Rose, including Rose walking around naked
in the presence of female colleagues); Susan Chira & Catrin Einhorn, How Tough Is It to Change
a Culture of Harassment? Ask Women at Ford, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2017/12/19/us/ford-chicago-sexual-harassment.html [https://perma.cc/
J7ET-JZBA] (detailing decades of sexual harassment at two Ford plants in Chicago); Ronan
Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s Accusers Tell Their
Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/fromaggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories [https://per
ma.cc/P949-MR8N] (detailing decades of allegations of sexual assault and harassment by film
executive Harvey Weinstein, including forced oral sex and rape); Melena Ryzik et al., Louis C.K.
Is Accused by 5 Women of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.ny
times.com/2017/11/09/arts/television/louis-ck-sexual-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/S37D5BJ3] (detailing allegations of comedian Louis C.K. masturbating in front of several women);
Maria Puente, Kevin Spacey Scandal: A Complete List of the 15 Accusers, USA TODAY (Nov.
16, 2017, 12:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/2017/11/07/kevin-spacey-scandalcomplete-list-13-accusers/835739001/ [https://perma.cc/EW7E-9WCX] (detailing allegations of
sexual harassment, assault, and attempted rape by actor Kevin Spacey, including incidents
involving minors).
354. See Berdahl et al., supra note 290, at 424.
355. Id. at 431; Alonso, supra note 266, at 495.
356. Bailey, supra note 173, at 309, 315.
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and some even try to rack up sexual conquests just like men.357 Once one
looks more deeply, however, the reality actually seems to be that women
must walk a thin line between the masculine and the feminine in the
modern world.358 While it generally has become culturally acceptable for
women to have sex outside of marriage, they cannot have too much
sex.359 Otherwise, they can be labeled as a “slut.”360
Yet, to the extent that they embrace the traditionally more masculine
script of sexual freedom and agency, the ways that women can be coerced
into having sex become more hidden.361 This coercion is hidden probably
because the ways that men can be coerced into having sex are also
hidden.362 It is assumed that a man will not have sex with another man
unless he wants to have sex with another man.363 A “real” man will do
whatever he can to fight off another man’s advances.364 This traditional
presumption completely ignores the reality that men are not equally
physically, economically, or socially powerful; there can be
circumstances where fighting another man off may not be feasible, as is
sometimes the case for women.365
The same dynamic can happen in the workplace. If a woman works in
a predominantly male environment where men engage in coarse and
sexually explicit language, she may choose to engage in this same type
of language fit in with the group.366 In Reed v. Shepard,367 Reed argued
that she engaged in sexually explicit language as a civilian jailer because
she believed that “tolerating and contributing to the crudeness of the jail
was necessary for her career.”368 But her decision to try and fit in led the

357. Id. at 315–16.
358. Id. at 316–17.
359. Id. at 316.
360. Id. at 317.
361. See id. at 319–26.
362. Id. at 307–09.
363. Id. at 307.
364. Id. at 303.
365. Id. at 307–08.
366. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1991), abrogation recognized
by Betts v. Container Corp. of Am., 114 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision);
see also Alonso, supra note 266, at 495 (“[W]omen and men who do not strongly identify with
traditional male norms may feel pressure to conform to masculinity contest norms . . . to gain and
maintain status in an organization.”).
367. 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991), abrogation recognized by Betts v. Container Corp. of
Am., 114 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
368. Id. at 492.
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Seventh Circuit to determine that the crudeness was not “unwelcome.”369
In other words, Reed’s hostile environment claim failed because of her
choice to embrace some of the masculine norms of her colleagues in an
effort to fit in and succeed at work.
The Seventh Circuit described the conduct in the jail as resembling “a
modern version of TV’s Barney Miller,370 with the typically raunchy
language and activities of an R-rated movie, and the antics imagined in a
high-school locker room.”371 The Seventh Circuit later suggested that
Reed did not have to make the choice to enthusiastically join in on this
behavior because “other female employees testified that the male jail
employees did not behave in this manner around women who asked them
not to.”372 But the court did not explore whether choosing not to engage
in this behavior affected the terms and conditions of the work of these
women. The hyper-masculine behavior in this jail marked this as a maleonly worksite that necessarily excluded women and men perceived as
gender-nonconforming. Notably, the Reed court failed to consider
whether Reed was trying to make the best out of a highly gendered work
situation.373 One reason that the court did not analyze Reed’s choice more
fully is because the gendered dynamic among men themselves has been
mostly hidden from both legal and social analyses.
For these reasons, it is time to consider a masculinities-modified
approach to sexual harassment. Under this approach, the law will be
interpreted in ways that allow both men and women to have more
freedom in how they perform their respective gender roles. In addition,
this approach will provide employees better opportunities to become
competent workers and enjoy all of the benefits of work regardless of
their sex.
CONCLUSION
Because of the important theoretical and legal work of feminists,
courts now recognize that sexual harassment is sex discrimination. Some
feminists have also tried to persuade courts to recognize the various ways
369. Id.; Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 966 (8th Cir. 1999) (determining that the
conduct at issue was not “unwelcome” when plaintiff engaged in similar conduct as the harassers
including yelling, speaking crudely, and telling off-color jokes).
370. Barney Miller was a television series that aired between 1975–1982 and portrayed a
New York Police Department precinct. See Barney Miller, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0072472/ [https://perma.cc/J2JE-DPBE].
371. Reed, 939 F.2d at 486.
372. Id. at 492.
373. See Alonso, supra note 266, at 495 (“[W]omen and men who do not strongly identify
with traditional male norms may feel pressure to conform to masculinity contest norms . . . to gain
and maintain status in an organization.”).
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that men can be sexually harassed, too. A masculinities-modified
approach, however, provides a supplemental lens through which to
analyze these cases more robustly. Because of the gendered relationship
that men have with one another, this approach suggests that some cases
that courts treat as mere “horseplay” among men perceived as genderconforming are actually sex discrimination. In addition, this approach
raises the question of whether the masculine competition among men that
leads to this type of harassment might be the epicenter of all sexual
harassment. Scholars need to examine more fully how sex discrimination
cases intersect with race, disability, national origin, and age cases. In
addition, they should consider the ways that a masculinities-modified
approach can help women attain greater equality in the workplace.
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